tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3931921496989071942.post7922314710055512863..comments2023-06-08T07:32:39.725-05:00Comments on Aristotle's Feminist Subject: feminist Bible translation: not "anything goes" but a lot more personalJ. K. Gaylehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07600312868663460988noreply@blogger.comBlogger7125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3931921496989071942.post-41449699458175898882008-03-26T06:30:00.000-05:002008-03-26T06:30:00.000-05:00although there may be SOME feminists who understan...<I>although there may be SOME feminists who understand the need to deal with binariness -- most feminists...</I><BR/><BR/>Rich, if feminism were a democracy in ancient Athens, then we might be in trouble. But I'm not sure this is a point I intended. So you've got me reflecting on my "second meaning." Aristotle would want numbers to count. That is, the majority rule would signal something hard in nature that could not change. Feminists and women have had to deal with the ugly nature of sexism and masculinism for a long long time. They have the audacity of hope...if the majority don't always. <BR/><BR/>Aristotle is a bigot, a chauvanist, and an elitist. He's a proud objectivist; and F. A. Wright is far too kind to say of Aristotle that "His mistake was that he failed to realise the moral aspects of feminism." The one thing Aristotle's got going for him is his consistency, a realization that his concepts of categories of persons puts him right above the majority on the planet: he's refined his method better than Paul of Christianity has refined his theology. The other way to look at Aristotle is this: once he happens upon his Isocrates-reworked rhetoric and his Plato-reinvented philosophy, he never grows. <BR/><BR/>If the majority of feminists fail to grow too, then shame shame shame. I think I did use the terms "good" and "bad" to describe certain feminisms. But feminists have to work against Aristotle from the margins; against what Prudence Allen carefully shows to be the "Aristotelian Revolution 750 BC-AD 1250." No surprise many take a few steps backwards.<BR/><BR/>So let's go forward.<BR/><BR/>We're talking about language difference as Pike talks about it and as Jesus effects it. It's the difference between Francis Bacon with "Essay" and Michel de Montaigne with "Essais." Notice how very very little Aristotle uses first person (and scientists and modernists in the last few centuries have caught on). No emics and etics. No, you have heard that it was said, but I say to you. No, this is for persons with ears to hear. No emphasis on subjectivities as a scientist like Blaise Pascal has. No no no. Aristotle hides behind logic. He stands above with cold observational strategy. His student helps him -- as a free Greek educated man -- to conquer the world. That's why there's such irony in Aristotelian principles in translation: Aristotle detests the barbarous stuff.<BR/><BR/>So when we men, Rich, listen to someone like Nancy Mairs, there's a qualitative difference. An epistemological difference. The majority of women have bodies constrained. Mairs lives in a wheelchair because of nature. But the society of men has required most females to exist with, as Cheryl Glenn puts it, "a closed mouth (silence), a closed body (chastity), and an enclosed life (domestic confinement)."<BR/><BR/>Mairs talks of women's discourse not as binary. (There's irony in my "not" here). Women's bodies are polymorphic. They must ebb and flow; in pregnancy they grown miraculously! Aristotle profoundly mischaracterizes women, and especially their bodies. He's not very much like Helene Cixous who insists nonetheless that women have value in writing the body.<BR/><BR/>My two favorite quotations of Mairs is how I'll end this comment. Despite what you say I've said about the majority of feminists being unwitting or even willing Aristotelians or Platonists, we men (you and me too!) would do well to listen a little better. With these two statements (from her <I>Voice Lessons</I>), Mairs demonstrates the wonderful audacious possibility for change for voice for agency of women confined by men like Aristotle. It's what Nelson Goodman might call "radical relativism." And, when there must be his "rigid restraints," look where they are: with kind consideration of others, of other people. So here goes (and let's listen and remember that Aristotle and most Aristotelians, even feminist Aristotelians, haven't learned to write like this):<BR/><BR/><I>"In a single sentence [the reviewer] reimposed the very dichotomies I had constructed the book in order to call into question, putting electrified fences around the categories 'academy' 'criticism,' and 'writing' to keep the various critters from intermingling, maybe interbreeding to create some nameless monster very like the one I aspire to be."</I><BR/><BR/><I>"Publication of any sort is an intrinsically social act, 'I' having no reason to speak aloud unless I posit 'you' there listening; but your presence is especially vital if I am seeking not to disclose the economic benefits of fish farming in Zäire, or to recount the imaginary tribulations of an adulterous doctor's wife in nineteenth-century France, but to reconnect myself—now so utterly transformed by events unlike any I've experienced before as to seem a stranger even to myself—to the human community....lending materiality to my readerly ideal, transform monologue into intercourse."</I>J. K. Gaylehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07600312868663460988noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3931921496989071942.post-44431355051335496072008-03-25T23:47:00.000-05:002008-03-25T23:47:00.000-05:00But then again, in your feminist binary post (whic...But then again, in your feminist binary post (which I just re-read after 5 months), you acknowledge that -- although there may be SOME feminists who understand the need to deal with binariness -- most feminists throw the Aristotelian baby out with the Platonic bath water.Richard A. Rhodeshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14227550014596898280noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3931921496989071942.post-83401914914302747812008-03-25T20:58:00.000-05:002008-03-25T20:58:00.000-05:00That goes to what I see as a fatal flaw in feminis...<I>That goes to what I see as a fatal flaw in feminism. There is a </I>de facto<I> claim that if you use linear thinking -- ever -- you're Platonist and Aristotelian to the core.</I><BR/><BR/>Here's where you misunderstand feminisms profoundly, Rich. Two examples of feminists understanding Aristotle and Plato, taking the good in their philosophies and sifting out the awful, <I><A HREF="http://books.google.com/books?id=_clplh2kAvkC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Feminist+Interpretations+of+Aristotle&ei=EavpR-rKM824igGg2LHgBA&sig=NiVcFqelds1AvU9F4BWu7z2hn4M" REL="nofollow">Feminist Interpretations of Aristotle (Re-Reading the Canon)</I></A> edited by Cynthia A. Freeland and <I><A HREF="http://books.google.com/books?id=6f-anA7r0kQC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Feminist+Interpretations+of+Plato&ei=P6vpR97JAZeOiQGlmoXKCQ&sig=Xs6oF6rMEM3mQbe5t93HlMhjm7E" REL="nofollow">Feminist Interpretations of Plato</I></A> edited by Nancy Tuana. <BR/><BR/>I've written a long post discussing <A HREF="http://speakeristic.blogspot.com/2007/11/feminist-binary-eleventh-step.html" REL="nofollow">the "feminist binary"</A> (vs. Aristotle's binary). Take a look if you like. The thesis is much like Audre Lorde's “The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s House,” a critique of white feminism that doesn't go far enough--but the methods aren't limited.<BR/><BR/>(Sorry to rush with the reply, but I want to respond and may not get back here for a little while. Thanks for your comments, Rich.)J. K. Gaylehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07600312868663460988noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3931921496989071942.post-31879383863233893092008-03-25T17:15:00.000-05:002008-03-25T17:15:00.000-05:00Oops, I forgot one thing. Jesus' use of the OT is ...Oops, I forgot one thing. Jesus' use of the OT is like a preacher's use of the Scripture nowadays. He gets to put a theologian's spin on it. That's the proper place of the theologian. But for my money that doesn't say anything about our translation methods. In fact, it generates a class of problems for some theologians who have certain preconceptions about what it means that Scripture be consistent. It doesn't bother me a whit. I'll translate the LXX verse one way, and the Matthew version another, and the Pauline version another. They are not textual critics -- not a big deal to me. It's, in fact, a problem to me that the translators of the KJV worked so hard to level those surface inconsistencies out. No, no. You translate what it says, Scripture doesn't need your help.Richard A. Rhodeshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14227550014596898280noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3931921496989071942.post-22845271994364245632008-03-25T17:05:00.000-05:002008-03-25T17:05:00.000-05:00[People] using Aristotle's logic and method don't ...<I>[People] using Aristotle's logic and method don't force us to play his game ... </I><BR/><BR/>Bingo.<BR/><BR/>That goes to what I see as a fatal flaw in feminism. There is a <I>de facto</I> claim that if you use linear thinking -- ever -- you're Platonist and Aristotelian to the core. Not so. I can use the notion of an excluded middle to help sharpen my thinking, but that doesn't mean that I believe it's the way the world works. I can recognize that categories exist and that we think (and therefore speak) in terms of categories, but that doesn't mean that I accept Plato's or Aristotle's categories or what they theorize about them -- particularly that, <I>contra</I> Plato, I -- and all cognitivists -- recognize that categories are a product of mind, and do not in any meaningful way pre-exist -- with the possible exception of some classes of micro-categories -- things like gravity and the solubility of substances and the like.<BR/><BR/>As for questions about whether there are interesting -- and valid -- interpretations of Scripture that are anachronistic, yes, I think there are. See <A HREF="http://www.metacatholic.co.uk/2008/01/shh-its-a-secret-the-rebs-not-very-mysterious/" REL="nofollow">Doug Chaplin</A> taking me to task on this issue. But I think that it runs contrary to the translators task to translate to the anachronism. That's why I'm adamant about the need to wring all of the anachronisms possible out of a translation, at least a translation of Scripture. Secular literature, now that's a different matter.Richard A. Rhodeshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14227550014596898280noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3931921496989071942.post-79720369443616877302008-03-25T07:16:00.000-05:002008-03-25T07:16:00.000-05:00Rich,I really appreciate your taking time to comme...Rich,<BR/>I really appreciate your taking time to comment here. What you say makes a lot of sense to me. When you start with a statement like, "There are lots of ways that language is ambiguous...[but] far less ambiguous than most people think," I start to follow what you're wanting us to see. <BR/><BR/>I get the tension you see: on one hand, "There's an enormous amount about Greek usage that isn't well understood"; AND "language in actual use is ambiguous...the people factor in language understanding...[with] meanings [that] are almost always layered in ways that linguists' examples generally flatten out." Hooray!! On the other hand, there's "an enormous amount of communication is in the second order"--"theologians jump in WAY too soon."--"the pomo crowd thrives on the fact that there are third and fourth order readings as well, especially in literature."<BR/><BR/>Here's my only refining comment. It's always back to "person." If a theologian or a postmodernist says something that's overly imaginative, then why can't that be checked? I'm thinking of the protestant reformation now, or even the theological community itself checking the cults in America. And I think an Alan Sokal and a Jean Bricmont can have some fun at pomo expense; how about English dept insider Frederick C. Crews with his <I>Postmodern Pooh</I>?<BR/><BR/>But despite the ostensible textual terrors of theologians and obscurantist postmodernists, there's this: there's Jesus re-reading the Law and the Prophets; there's his telling parables (which invoke a subjective response in the hearer who has ears to hear); there's his over the top hyperbole (which invokes a different kind of subjective response to the more resistant); there's his use of miracle (which reworks nature in more ways than a theologian or a postmodernist can rework the original intentions of an author and his/her text).<BR/><BR/>If Jesus is too high a figure for us, then how about C.S. Lewis. Who focuses on "myth" and ephemeral "joy" as epistemology; who says "first" and "second" order consciousness (forget Freud for the moment with the sub-consciousness) are "enjoyment" and "contemplation"? Lewis also says authors intentions may be after the fact, intentions in the hand of readers, acknowledged and unacknowledged "second meanings." Always ambiguous because always personal.<BR/><BR/>Theologians and postmodernists and other masculinists using Aristotle's logic and method don't force us to play his game, do they? No, person is above logic, Pike says.J. K. Gaylehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07600312868663460988noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3931921496989071942.post-76566729844205755802008-03-24T21:13:00.000-05:002008-03-24T21:13:00.000-05:00Kurk,It's been a while since I've had the time and...Kurk,<BR/>It's been a while since I've had the time and mental space to comment. But since you bring my name up regarding ambiguity. I'd like to throw something in here.<BR/><BR/>There are lots of ways that language is ambiguous. (Normally, I'd say vague, but the common parlance is ambiguous.) This is not a contradiction of former assertions about language not being ambiguous, because I've always said language, in context (the whole context, not just the other words) is far less ambiguous than most people think.<BR/><BR/>From my point of view (and one that I believe Pike shared) the fatal mistake of postmodernists is to ignore all the "other" context. Pomo writers see readings that are possible from the words, but impossible if you fully understand who was speaking/writing to whom under what circumstances.<BR/><BR/>Now that DOESN'T mean that everything is always clear. Often we don't have the full story on the author, audience, and circumstance. So the text appears to us to have meanings that weren't available, but we can't know that for sure. And all literature has enough depth for some of those "unintended" readings to be worthwhile in their own right. Nonetheless, it is incumbent on the translator to get as much of the author-audience-circumstance right as is possible. And my argument has been from the beginning that there is a LOT more information available about the NT from both text-external sources and especially from text-internal exegesis, than is currently employed. My complaint is that theologians jump in WAY too soon. <BR/><BR/>You have a parse? OK, time to ask the theologians.<BR/><BR/>Absolutely not! There's an enormous amount about Greek usage that isn't well understood. (One that I've been in a month long conversation with the Greek composition professor about is: When can you use ἔχει alone to mean "(she)'s pregnant" and when do you have to say ἔχει ἐν γαστρί?) When that work is done on the relevant passage, then the theologians get to chime in.<BR/><BR/>The other way that language in actual use is ambiguous -- or as you keep pointing out, the people factor in language understanding. Is that meanings are almost always layered in ways that linguists' examples generally flatten out. There's a piece of the meaning that is first order. But an enormous amount of communication is in the second order: what the person is trying to accomplish communicatively by saying the particular thing she/he did. Those second order communications are often more vague than the first order meanings because of their indirectness.<BR/><BR/>The problem for the translator comes from the fact that second order meanings become routinized (that is that the same communicative strategies tend to be used over and over) and as a result second order meanings ooze into first order meanings. So the ambiguity -- as you would say -- arises when we hit examples in the transition. Does the transitioning expression represent an indirect reference to the first order meaning, or is the second order meaning the de facto first order meaning? Not a small problem. When we translate, do we translate the first order meaning and expect the reader to follow the logic? or do we translate the second order (or maybe first and a half order) meaning?<BR/><BR/>Industry standard says treat the conventionalized meanings as first order.<BR/><BR/>Finally, the pomo crowd thrives on the fact that there are third and fourth order readings as well, especially in literature. In fact, I'd argue that the roots of post-modernism arise because they thought that it was (is) beneath their dignity to deal with actual morphemes, so they can't (always) tell first, second, third, etc. order meanings apart. They simply recognize that they are being sucked down in a recursive eddy of possible readings. And it's easier to deny author's intent than it is to sort out the order of meanings if grammar is beneath you.Richard A. Rhodeshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14227550014596898280noreply@blogger.com