Aristotle's 2nd "definition": "translations" & "commentary"

Here’s Aristotle’s second “definition” of “rhetoric” (to start what we call Chapter 2 of Book I of the Rhetoric):

Ἔστω δὴ ἡ ῥητορικὴ δύναμις περὶ ἕκαστον του̂ θεωρη̂σαι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν.

Here’s “translation” into “English” by some of us (respectively,

John H. Freese, 1926;

Rhys Roberts, 1954;

Hugh Lawson-Tancred, 1991;

George A. Kennedy, 1991;

Jeffrey Walker, a, 2003,

Jeffrey Walker, i, 2003,

Jeffrey Walker, ii, 2003,

Jeffrey Walker, iii, 2003;

and from some of us, starting from 2007)

Rhetoric then may be defined as the faculty of discovering the possible means of persuasion in reference to any subject whatever.

Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion.

Let rhetoric be the power to observe the persuasiveness of which any particular matter admits.

Let rhetoric be [defined as] an ability, in each [particular] case, to see the available means of persuasion.³²

a “Rhetoric is a faculty of observing the available means of persuasion in any given case” (or something to that effect)

i Let’s say that rhetoric is a faculty of observing the available means of persuasion — where will that get us?

ii Rhetoric is a faculty of observing considering judging speculating about making inferences about being a spectator gazing at the available means of persuasion the persuasive or plausible thing what is persuasive or plausible the persuasive what is persuasive what is admissible, allowable, or acceptable as persuasive in a specific case.

iii Rhetoric is a faculty of theorizing what is admissible, allowable, or acceptable as persuasive in a specific case.

Let’s say speakerliness really is an ability around each one’s view of what’s taken to be persuasive.

Here’s now some commentary-ish-ness around some of the “translation” above:

On ἔστω, Freese, Roberts, and Lawson-Tancred say nothing.

On ἔστω, Kennedy says this in a thirty-second footnote:

32. Aristotle uses the phrase estō dē, “Let X be . . . ,” commonly of a working hypothesis rather than a final definition and ocasionally to resume a definition made earlier. The definition here was anticipated in 1.1.14 on the ergon of rhetoric. In Topics 6.12.149b26-28 Aristotle quotes a definition of an orator as one having the ability to see the persuasive in each case and omit nothing.

On ἔστω, Walker says this (referring mainly to his translation that I’m labelling “i” above):

Most obviously, the phrase “rhetoric is” — the usual way the definition gets invoked — elides the fact that Aristotle’s estô de rhêtorikê employs a third-person imperative, estô, meaning something like “let rhetoric be,” which some translations render as “rhetoric may be defined as.” What commonly gets lost is the fact that Aristotle is invoking a stipulative definition, as in a speculative argument or mathematical hypothesis, where one says “let the value of X be Y.” Aristotle, one might say, is stipulating a contentious definition, an opening position, in order to give a particular philosophical account of rhetoric.

Let’s see, then, just where all Aristotle uses ἔστω (and how) with my highlighting Book I with green, II with yellow, and III with blue:

[1355a] II. [1] ἔστω δὴ ἡ ῥητορικὴ δύναμις περὶ ἕκαστον του̂ θεωρη̂σαι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν

[1360b] V.[3] ἔστω δὴ εὐδαιμονία εὐπραξία μετ' ἀρετη̂ς, ἢ αὐτάρκεια ζωη̂ς, ἢ ὁ βίος ὁ μετὰ ἀσφαλείας ἥδιστος, ἢ εὐθενία κτημάτων καὶ σωμάτων μετὰ δυνάμεως φυλακτικη̂ς τε καὶ πρακτικη̂ς τούτων: σχεδὸν γὰρ τούτων ἓν ἢ πλείω τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὁμολογου̂σιν εἰ̂ναι ἅπαντες.

[1362a]VI.[2] ἔστω δὴ ἀγαθὸν ὃ ἂν αὐτὸ ἑαυτου̂ ἕνεκα ᾐ̂ αἱρετόν, καὶ οὑ̂ ἕνεκα ἄλλο αἱρούμεθα, καὶ οὑ̂ ἐφίεται πάντα, ἢ πάντα τὰ αἴσθησιν ἔχοντα ἢ νου̂ν ἢ εἰ λάβοι νου̂ν, καὶ ὅσα ὁ νου̂ς ἂν ἑκάστῳ ἀποδοίη, καὶ ὅσα ὁ περὶ ἕκαστον νου̂ς ἀποδίδωσιν ἑκάστῳ:

[1363b]VII.[2] ἔστω δὴ ὑπερέχον μὲν τὸ τοσου̂τον καὶ ἔτι, ὑπερεχόμενον δὲ τὸ ἐνυπάρχον, καὶ μει̂ζον μὲν ἀεὶ καὶ πλει̂ον πρὸς ἔλαττον,

[1368a] X́. [3] εστω δὴ τὸ ἀδικει̂ν τὸ βλάπτειν ἑκόντα παρὰ τὸν νόμον. νόμος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ μὲν ἴδιος ὁ δὲ κοινός: λέγω δὲ ἴδιον μὲν καθ' ὃν γεγραμμένον πολιτεύονται, κοινὸν δὲ ὅσα ἄγραφα παρὰ πα̂σιν ὁμολογει̂σθαι δοκει̂.

[1378a] II. [1] ἔστω δὴ ὀργὴ ὄρεξις μετὰ λύπης τιμωρίας [φαινομένης] διὰ φαινομένην ὀλιγωρίαν εἰς αὐτὸν ἤ τω̂ν αὐτου̂, του̂ ὀλιγωρει̂ν μὴ προσήκοντος. [2]

[1380a]III. [2] ἔστω δὴ πράϋνσις κατάστασις καὶ ἠρέμησις ὀργη̂ς.

IV. [2] ἔστω δὴ τὸ φιλει̂ν τὸ βούλεσθαί τινι ἃ οἴεται ἀγαθά, ἐκείνου ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ μὴ αὑτου̂, [1381a]

[1382a] V. [1] ἔστω δὴ ὁ φόβος λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ ἐκ φαντασίας μέλλοντος κακου̂ φθαρτικου̂ ἢ λυπηρου̂:

[1383b] VII. [1] [2] ἔστω δὴ αἰσχύνη λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ περὶ τὰ εἰς ἀδοξίαν φαινόμενα φέρειν τω̂ν κακω̂ν, ἢ παρόντων ἢ γεγονότων ἢ μελλόντων,

[1385a] VII. [2] ἔστω δὴ χάρις, καθ' ἣν ὁ ἔχων λέγεται χάριν ἔχειν, ὑπουργία τῳ̂ δεομένῳ μὴ ἀντί τινος, μηδ' ἵνα τι αὐτῳ̂ τῳ̂ ὑπουργου̂ντι ἀλλ' ἵνα τι ἐκείνῳ:

[1385b] VIII. [2] ἔστω δὴ ἔλεος λύπη τις ἐπὶ φαινομένῳ κακῳ̂ φθαρτικῳ̂ ἢ λυπηρῳ̂ του̂ ἀναξίου τυγχάνειν, ὃ κἂν αὐτὸς προσδοκήσειεν (15) ἂν παθει̂ν ἢ τω̂ν αὑτου̂ τινα, καὶ του̂το ὅταν πλησίον φαίνηται:

[1404a] II. ἔστω οὐ̂ν ἐκει̂να τεθεωρημένα καὶ ὡρίσθω λέξεως ἀρετὴ σαφη̂ εἰ̂ναι ̔σημει̂ον γάρ τι ὁ λόγος ὤν, ἐὰν μὴ δηλοι̂ οὐ ποιήσει τὸ ἑαυτου̂ ἔργον̓, καὶ μήτε ταπεινὴν μήτε ὑπὲρ τὸ ἀξίωμα, ἀλλὰ πρέπουσαν:

[1410b] X. [2] εἴπωμεν οὐ̂ν καὶ διαριθμησώμεθα: ἀρχὴ δ' ἔστω ἡμι̂ν αὕτη.

[1417b] [11] ἐν δὲ δημηγορίᾳ ἥκιστα διήγησις ἔστιν, ὅτι περὶ τω̂ν μελλόντων οὐθεὶς διηγει̂ται: ἀλλ' ἐάν περ διήγησις ᾐ̂, τω̂ν γενομένων ἔστω, ἵνα ἀναμνησθέντες ἐκείνων βέλτιον βουλεύσωνται περὶ τω̂ν ὕστερον, ἢ διαβάλλοντος ἢ ἐπαινου̂ντος: ἀλλὰ †τότε οὐ† τὸ του̂ συμβούλου ποιει̂ ἔργον.

[1417b] XVII [3] ἐν δὲ τοι̂ς ἐπιδεικτικοι̂ς τὸ πολὺ ὅτι καλὰ καὶ ὠφέλιμα ἡ αὔξησις ἔστω:

We immediately tend to agree with Kennedy that there’s often a “working hypothesis” and with Walker that there’s “an opening position” when Aristotle uses ἔστω. And with Walker, we see perhaps the stipulation and contention evoked.

But what we shouldn’t miss is the social nature of this odd third-person imperative. Aristotle uses the verb and it’s (objective) person and it’s (subjective) mood to call upon his readers and listeners with him, to make meaning together. Aristotle is hardly categorizing and classifying some context-independent nature-constructed Truth-affirmed self-evident thing-in-itself. Aristotle is calling for agreement, for participation, for personal individual-and-group-insider meaning-making.

Ἔστω Aristotle begins, and thus he begs readers (even you and me): Let’s say [something] is. The δὴ is important to Aristotle and his audience to get ideas started; but, really, we might emphasize also, by Book III around “style,” clearly we’re not needing the little word in the same way.

So . . . Let’s say speakerliness really is . . .

And . . . δύναμις might mean dynamite power; but why not ability?

Then . . . περὶ, a pre-position and something periglottic no doubt. Why not around and physically approximate?

For ἕκαστον . . . τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν is around what’s taken to be persuasive for each one . . .

Ultimately, there’s του̂ θεωρη̂σαι, or the view (which without transliterating it “theorizing” can let us let it be, with Walker, a theorizing view).

Which makes, as we make it together,

Ἔστω δὴ ἡ ῥητορικὴ δύναμις περὶ ἕκαστον του̂ θεωρη̂σαι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν.

turn out to be (as Sara J. Newman puts it, “Aristotle’s second definitional statement, which is . . . nonmetaphorical,” like) this

Let’s say speakerliness really is an ability around each one’s view of what’s taken to be persuasive.